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Abstract
We provide a lifecycle framework for comparing the insurance value and the in-
centive cost of disability benefits. We estimate the risks that individuals face and the
parameters governing the disability insurance program using longitudinal US data on
consumption, health, disability insurance, and wages. We characterize the economic
eﬀects of disability insurance and study how policy reforms impact behavior and house-
hold welfare. Disability insurance is characterised by high rejections rates of disabled
applicants; acceptances of healthy applicants is less widespread. Welfare increases as:
(1) the program becomes less strict, reducing rejection rates among the disabled, de-
spite the worsening of incentives; (2) generosity is reduced or reassessments increased
because false applications decline; (3) the generosity of unconditional means-tested
benefits is increased.
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1 Introduction
The Disability Insurance (DI) program in the US is a large and rapidly growing social
insurance program o¤ering income replacement and health care benets to people with work
limiting disabilities. In 2007, the cash benets paid by the DI program were three times larger
than those paid by Unemployment Insurance (UI) ($99.1 billions vs. $32.5 billions)1 and
between 1985 and 2007 the proportion of DI claimants in the US has almost doubled (from
about 2.5% to almost 5% of the working-age population, see Duggan and Imberman, 2009).
The key questions in thinking about the size and growth of the program are whether program
claimants are genuinely unable to work, whether those in need are receiving insurance, and
how valuable is the insurance provided vis-à-vis the ine¢ ciencies created by the program.
In this paper we evaluate the welfare consequences of reforming some key aspects of
the DI program that are designed to alter the dynamics of the trade-o¤ between costs and
insurance aspects of the program. This evaluation exercise requires a realistic model of
individual behavior; a set of credible estimates of preferences, risks, and of the details of the
program; and a way to measure the welfare consequences of the reforms.
We address these aims in three steps. First we propose a life cycle framework that allows
us to study savings, labor supply, and the decision to apply for DI under non-separable
preferences. We consider the problem of an individual who faces several sources of risk: a
disability or work limitation shock which reduces the ability to work, a permanent produc-
tivity shock unrelated to health (such as a decline in the price of skills), and labor market
frictions. We assume that the DI program screens applicants with errors and re-assesses
them probabilistically following award. Second, we obtain estimates of the parameters of
the model using microeconomic data from the Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID) and
the Consumer Expenditure Survey (CEX). We use data on employment, wages, consumption,
and self-assessed reports of disability which allow us to distinguish between no, moderate,
and severe work limitations. Identication is in three stages: rst, we estimate health risk
directly from transitions across health status over the lifecycle, assuming that health status
evolves exogenously; second, we estimate wage risk and the e¤ect of disability on wages by
using data on wages and the variance of unexplained wage growth, controlling for selection
1The relative size of DI is even larger if we add the in-kind health care benets provided by the Medicare
program to DI beneciaries. After 2007 the di¤erences are less dramatic due to the recession-induced
expansion of UI.
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into work. Third, we use our model to identify through indirect inference the preference
parameters and the parameters of the DI program. This involves using information on the
recipients of DI, as well as individualsparticipation and consumption decisions across the
life-cycle. We show that the model replicates well salient features of reality both internally
in terms of matching targeted moments, as well as externally in terms of matching from the
literature reduced form elasticities measuring the costs of the program, screening errors, exit
ows, and wealth patterns. In the nal step of the paper, we analyze the impact on welfare
and behavior of varying key policy parameters: (a) the generosity of disability payments,
(b) the stringency of the screening process, (c) the generosity of alternative social insurance
programs, and (d) the re-assessment rate. The ability to evaluate these questions in a co-
herent, unied framework is one of the main benets of the paper. Our metric for household
welfare is the consumption equivalent that keeps expected utility at the start of life constant
as policy changes. We show that the welfare e¤ects are determined by the dynamics of in-
surance for disabled workers (coverage) and of application rates by non-disabled workers
(false applications) as the policy changes.
We document a number of important ndings. First, the disability insurance program
is characterized by substantial false rejections. Our distinction between those with no work
limitation versus a moderate limitation highlights that false acceptances exist among the
moderately disabled, but are small for those without any limitation. Second, in terms of
policy reforms, the high fraction of false rejections associated with the screening process of
the disability insurance program leads to an increase in welfare when the program becomes
less strict, despite the increase in false applications. This is because coverage among those
most in need goes up (for example, those with less savings and so less self-insurance). Second,
welfare is higher if the generosity of DI is reduced and if reassessment is more frequent. Both
of these reforms have a large impact reducing the number of applications from those with
only a moderate disability at little cost in terms of reduced coverage for those in need. It
is this di¤erence in responsiveness to incentives among the moderately disabled compared
to the severely disabled which underlies our policy conclusions. This distinction is novel
to our paper and explains the di¤erence between our ndings and those elsewhere in the
literature where responsiveness is not disaggregated by the severity of disability. Finally,
DI interacts in important ways with other welfare programs. We show that an increase in
generosity of means-tested programs reduces DI application rates by non-disabled workers
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and increases insurance coverage among disabled workers. This positive combination arise
because marginal undeserving applicants use the means-tested program as a substitute for
DI (they switch to a program that is increasingly as generous as DI but has less uncertainty),
while truly disabled workers used it as a complement (they use the more generous income
oor to nance their consumption in case of rejection).
The literature on the DI program, surveyed in the next Section, contains both reduced
form papers attempting to separately estimate the extent of ine¢ ciencies created by the
program and its insurance value, as well as sophisticated structural analyses geared towards
assessing the consequences of reforming the program. As with most structural models, the
value of our approach relative to reduced form analyses is that we can evaluate the conse-
quences of potential reforms to the DI program, i.e., we can examine counterfactual cases
that have not been experienced in the past or that are too costly to assess in a randomized
evaluation context. Relative to existing structural analyses, we stress the importance of
a number of model features: di¤erent degrees of work limitation, early life cycle choices,
non-separable preferences, xed costs of work that depend on work limitation status, per-
manent skill shocks, and interactions between di¤erent welfare programs. Further, we study
the e¤ects of novel policy reforms, and subject our model to various validity tests. For our
structural model to deliver credible policy conclusions, we require that it ts the data in
a number of key dimensions (internal validity) and that it can replicate the estimates pre-
vailing in the reduced form literature without targeting these estimates directly (external
validation). We show to what extent our model passes these tests.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 reviews the relevant literature
on the DI program. Section 3 presents the life-cycle model and discusses how we model
preferences, the sources of risk faced by individuals, and the social insurance programs
available to them. Section 4 summarizes the data used in the estimation of the model,
focusing on the data on disability status and on consumption. Section 5 discusses the
identication strategy, presents the estimates of the structural parameters, and discusses
both the internal and external t of the model in a number of key dimensions. Section 6
carries out counter-factual policy experiments, reporting the e¤ects on behavior and average
household welfare of potential reforms of DI, along with sensitivity tests of these experiments.
Section 7 concludes and discusses limitations and directions for future work.
3
2 Literature Review
The literature on DI has evolved in three di¤erent directions: (1) papers that estimate,
typically in a reduced form way, the disincentive e¤ects of the DI program; (2) papers that
estimate, again using reduced form strategies, the welfare benets of the program; and (3)
papers that estimate structural models in order to evaluate the welfare consequences of
reforming the program. Our paper belongs to the third line of research but we stress the
importance of matching evidence from the rst and second lines.
Incentive E¤ects of DI. There is an extensive literature estimating the costs of the
DI program in terms of ine¢ ciency of the screening process and the disincentive e¤ects on
labor supply decisions.
Since disability status is private information, there are errors involved in the screening
process. The only direct attempt to measure such errors is Nagi (1969), who uses a sample of
2,454 initial disability determinations. These individuals were examined by an independent
medical and social team. Nagi (1969) concluded that, at the time of the award, about 19%
of those initially awarded benets were undeserving, and 48% of those denied were truly
disabled. To the extent that individuals recover but do not ow o¤ DI, we would expect
the fraction falsely claiming to be higher in the stock than at admission. This is the nding
of Benitez-Silva et al. (2006a), using self-reported disability data on the over 50s from the
Health and Retirement Study (HRS): over 40% of recipients of DI are not truly work limited.
We compare these estimates of the screening errors to the estimates of our model. These
errors raise the question of whether the cheatersare not at all disabled or whether they
have only a partial work limitation. With our distinction between severe work limitations
and moderate limitations, we are able to explore this issue. Moreover, we assume that
disability evolves over the lifecycle, which allows for both medical recoveries and further
health declines.
In terms of labor supply e¤ects, the incentive for individuals to apply for DI rather than
to work has been addressed by asking how many DI recipients would be in the labor force in
the absence of the program.2 Identifying an appropriate control group has proved di¢ cult
2Some of the costs of the program derive from beneciaries staying on the program despite health im-
provements. Evidence on the e¤ectiveness of incentives to move the healthy o¤ DI is scant: Hoynes and
Mo¢ tt (1997) conclude via simulations that some of the reforms aimed at allowing DI beneciaries to keep
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(see Parsons, 1980; Bound, 1989). Bound (1989) uses rejected DI applicants as a control
group and nds that only 1/3 to 1/2 of rejected applicants are working, and this is taken
as an upper bound of how many DI beneciaries would be working in the absence of the
program. This result has proved remarkably robust. Chen and van der Klaauw (2008) report
similar magnitudes. As do French and Song (2011) and Maestas et al. (2011), who use the
arguably more credible control group of workers who were not awarded benets because
their application was examined by tougher disability examiners (as opposed to similar
workers whose application was examined by more lenientadjudicators). Von Wachter et
al. (2011) stress that there is heterogeneity in the response to DI, and that younger, less
severely disabled workers are more responsive to economic incentives than the older groups
usually analyzed. Further, this growth in younger claimants has been a key change in the
composition of claimants since 1984.3 We compare the implied elasticity of employment with
respect to benet generosity that comes from our model with the estimates of such elasticity
in the literature.
A further dimension of the incentive cost of the program is the possibility that poor labor
market conditions (such as declines in individual productivity due to negative shocks to skill
prices or low arrival rates of job o¤ers), increase applications for the DI program. Black et
al. (2002) use the boom and bust in the mining industry in some US states (induced by
the exogenous shifts in coal and oil prices of the 1970s) to study employment decisions and
participation in the DI program. They show that participation in the DI program is much
more likely for permanent than transitory skill shocks. In our framework, we distinguish
between these di¤erent types of shock.
Estimates of the benets of the program The literature on the welfare benets of
DI is more limited. Some papers (e.g. Meyer and Mok, 2007, and Stephens, 2001, for the US;
and Ball and Low, 2012, for the UK) rst quantify the amount of health risk faced by workers
and then measure the value of insurance by looking at the decline in consumption that follows
more of their earnings on returning to work are unlikely to be successful and may, if anything, increase the
number of people applying for DI.
3These incentive e¤ects have implications for aggregate unemployment. Autor and Duggan (2013) nd
that the DI program lowered measured US unemployment by 0.5 percentage points between 1984 and 2001
as individuals moved onto DI. This movement was rstly because the rise in wage inequality in the US,
coupled with the progressivity of the formula used to compute DI benets, implicitly increased replacement
rates for people at the bottom of the wage distribution (increasing demand for DI benets). Secondly, in
1984 the program was reformed and made more liberal (increasing the supply of DI benets).
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a poor health episode. Chandra and Sandwick (2009) use a standard life cycle model, add
disability risk (which they model as a permanent, involuntary retirement shock) and compute
the consumers willingness to pay to eliminate such risk. These papers interpret any decline
in consumption in response to uninsured health shocks as a measure of the welfare value
of insurance, ignoring the question of whether preferences are non-separable and health-
dependent. However, consumption may fall optimally even if health shocks are fully insured,
for example because consumption needs are reduced when sick, leading to consumption and
poor health being substitutes in utility. We allow explicitly for health-dependent preferences
which provides a better assessment of the welfare benets of the DI program.
The value of reforming the DI program The broader issue of the value of DI
and the e¤ects of DI reform requires combining estimates of the risk associated with health
shocks alongside the evaluation of the insurance and incentives provided by DI. Similar to
our paper, previous work by Bound et al. (2004, 2010), Benitez-Silva et al. (2002), and
Waidmann et al. (2003) has also highlighted the importance of considering both sides of
the insurance/incentive trade-o¤ for welfare analysis and conducted some policy experiments
evaluating the consequences of reforming the program. These papers di¤er in focus and this
leads to di¤erences in the way preferences, risk, and the screening process are modeled; and
in the data and estimation procedure used.4
Benitez-Silva et al. (2006b) use the HRS and focus on older workers. Their model is used
to predict the implications of introducing the $1 for $2 benet o¤set, i.e., a reduction of
$1 in benets for every $2 in earnings a DI beneciary earns above the substantial gainful
activity(SGA) ceiling. Currently, there is a 100% tax (people get disqualied for benets
if earning more than the SGA). The e¤ect of the reform is estimated to be small. While the
model is very detailed, non-employment rates by age in the data are substantially lower than
in the simulations, while the stocks on DI are overpredicted, and there is no disaggregation
by health. Disaggregation by health may be important. As stressed by von Wachter et al.
(2011), behavioral responses to incentives in the DI program di¤er by age and by health
4There is a purely theoretical literature on optimal disability insurance, such as the model of Diamond
and Sheshinski (1995) and the Golosov and Tsyvinsky (2004) result on the desirability of asset testing DI
benets. Rather than optimality, our focus is on the estimation of the value and incentives of the actual DI
program and the aim is to provide welfare analysis of possible program reforms. We relate our results to the
theoretical literature in section 6.
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status, with the young being the most responsive.
The paper closest to ours is Bound et al. (2010). They specify a dynamic programming
model that looks at the interaction of health shocks, disposable income, and the labor market
behavior of men. The innovative part of their framework is that they model health as a
continuous latent variable for which discrete disability is an indicator. This is similar to our
focus on di¤erent degrees of severity of health shocks. However, the focus of their paper is
on modelling behavior among the old (aged 50 and over from the HRS), rather than over
the whole lifecycle. Further, the decline in labour market participation among the old is not
disaggregated by health status and does not match the decline in the data. The point of our
paper is that we need a life-cycle perspective to capture fully the insurance benets, and we
need an accurate characterization of labor supply behavior and applications to the program
to capture fully the incentive costs of the program.
3 Life-Cycle Model
3.1 Individual Problem
We consider the problem of an individual who maximizes lifetime expected utility:
max
c;P;DIApp
Vit = Et
TX
s=t
s tU(cis; Pis;Lis)
where  is the discount factor, Et the expectations operator conditional on information avail-
able in period t (a period being a quarter of a year), P a discrete f0; 1g employment indicator,
ct consumption, and Lt a discrete work limitation (disability) status indicator f0; 1; 2g, cor-
responding to no limitation, a moderate limitation and a severe limitation, respectively.
Work limitation status is often characterized by a f0; 1g indicator (as in Benitez-Silva et
al., 2006a). We use a three state indicator to investigate the importance of distinguishing
between moderate and severe work limitations. Individuals live for T periods, may work TW
years (from age 23 to 62), and face an exogenous mandatory spell of retirement of TR = 10
years at the end of life. The date of death is known with certainty and there is no bequest
motive.
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The intertemporal budget constraint during the working life has the form
Ait+1 = R
2664
Ait + (with (1  w)  F (Lit))Pit
+(BitZ
UI
it
 
1  ZDIit

+DitZ
DI
it + SSIitZ
DI
it Z
W
it ) (1  Pit)
+WitZ
W
it   cit
3775
where A are beginning of period assets, R is the interest factor, w the hourly wage rate,
h a xed number of hours (corresponding to 500 hours per quarter), w a proportional tax
rate that is used to nance social insurance programs, F the xed cost of work that depends
on disability status, B unemployment benets, W the monetary value of a means-tested
welfare payment, D the amount of disability insurance payments obtained, SSI the amount
of Supplemental Security Income (SSI) benets, and ZDI , ZUI and ZW are recipiency f0; 1g
indicators for disability insurance, the means-tested welfare program and unemployment
insurance, respectively.5 We assume that unemployment insurance is paid only on job de-
struction and only for one quarter; the means-tested welfare program is an anti-poverty
program providing a oor to income, similar to Food Stamps, and this is how we will refer
to it in the rest of the paper. Recipiency ZWit depends on income being below a certain
(poverty) threshold. The way we model both programs is described fully in the Appendix.
The workers problem is to decide whether to work or not. When unemployed, the deci-
sion is whether to accept a job that may have been o¤ered or wait longer. The unemployed
person will also have the option to apply for disability insurance (if eligible). Whether em-
ployed or not, the individual has to decide how much to save and consume. Accumulated
savings are used to nance consumption at any time, particularly during spells out of work
and retirement.
We assume that individuals are unable to borrow: Ait  0 8t. This constraint has
bite because it precludes borrowing against social insurance and means-tested programs.
At retirement, people collect social security benets which are paid according to a formula
similar to the one we observe in reality, and is the same as the one used for DI benets (see
below). Social security benets, along with assets that people have voluntarily accumulated
over their working years, are used to nance consumption during retirement. The structure
of the individuals problem is similar to life-cycle models of savings and labour supply, such
as Low et al. (2010). The innovations in our set-up are to consider the risk that arises
5We do not have an SSI recipiency indicator because that is a combination of receiving DI and being
eligible for means-tested transfers.
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from work limitation shocks, distinguishing between the severity of the shocks, the explicit
modelling of disability insurance, and the interaction of disability insurance with other social
insurance programs.
While eligibility and receipt of disability insurance are not means-tested, in practice
high education individuals are rarely beneciaries of the program. In our PSID data set
individuals with low and high education have similar DI recipiency rates only until their
mid-30s (about 1%), but after that age the di¤erence between the two groups increases
dramatically. By age 60, the low educated are four times more likely to be DI claimants
than the high educated (16% vs. 4%).6 Figure 4 in the Appendix provides the details. Given
these large di¤erences, in the remainder of the paper we focus on low education individuals
(those with at most a high school degree), with the goal of studying the population group
that is more likely to be responsive to changes in the DI program and most likely to value
the insurance.
While our model is richer than existing characterizations in most dimensions, there are
certain limitations of our model. First, we model individual behavior rather than family
behavior and hence neglect insurance coming from, for example, spousal labor supply. On the
other hand, we assume that social insurance is always taken up when available. Second, in our
model health shocks result in a decline in productivity which indirectly a¤ects consumption
expenditure, but we ignore direct health costs (i.e., drugs and health insurance) that may
shift the balance across consumption spending categories.7 Third, we do not allow for health
investments which may reduce the impact of a health shock. This assumption makes health
risk independent of the decision process and so can be estimated outside of the model. As
we shall discuss, however, we do allow health shocks to a¤ect non-health related individual
productivity shocks through shifts in the variance of such shocks. Moreover, we focus on
a group of relatively homogeneous individuals (with low education), while in practice most
heterogeneity in health investment occurs between education. We discuss how our results
may depend on these assumptions in the concluding section.
We now turn to a discussion of the three key elements of the problem: (a) preferences,
(b) wages, and (c) social insurance.
6The low DI participation rates among the high educated is partly due to the vocational criterion used
by the SSA for awarding DI (described later).
7Our measure of consumption in the data excludes health spending.
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3.2 Preferences
We use a utility function of the form
u (cit; Pit;Lit) =
(cit exp (Lit) exp (Pit))
1 
1   (1)
We set  = 1:5 based on papers in the literature (see footnote 20), and estimate  and
. To be consistent with disability and work being bads, we require  < 0 and  < 0,
two restrictions that as we shall see are not rejected by the data. The parameter  captures
the utility loss for the disabled in terms of consumption. Employment also induces a utility
loss determined by the value of . This implies that consumption and work are Frisch
complements (i.e. the marginal utility of consumption is higher when working) and that the
marginal utility of consumption is higher when su¤ering from a work limitation. 8
If individuals are fully insured, individuals will keep marginal utility constant across
states.  < 0 implies that individuals who are fully insured want more expenditure allocated
to the disabilitystate, for example because they have larger spending needs when disabled
(alternative transportation services, domestic services, etc.). 9
3.3 The Wage Process and Labour Market Frictions
We model the wage process for individual i as being subject to shocks to work limi-
tation status, general productivity (skill) shocks, as well as the contribution of observable
characteristics Xit:
lnwit = X
0
it+ '11fLit = 1g+ '21fLit = 2g+ "it (2)
where
"it = "it 1 +  it
The work limitation status of an individual, Lit, evolves according to a three state rst-
order Markov process. Upon entry into the labor market, all individuals are assumed to
8In addition to the non-separable e¤ect of disability, there may be an additive utility loss associated with
disability. Since disability is not a choice, we cannot identify this additive term. Further, such an additive
utility loss would be uninsurable because only consumption can be substituted across states.
9Lillard and Weiss (1997) also nd evidence for  < 0 using HRS savings and health status data. On the
other hand, Finkelstein et al. (2008) use health data and subjective well-being data to proxy for utility and
nd  > 0.
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be healthy (Li0 = 0). Transition probabilities from any state depend on age. We assume
that these transition probabilities are exogenous. We interpret "it as a measure of individ-
ual unobserved productivity that is mean-independent of health shocks - examples would
include shocks to the value and price of individual skills - and interpret  it as a permanent
productivity shock. Besides allowing health shocks to a¤ect mean o¤ered wages through the
'1 and '2 parameters, we also allow the process determining the wage innovations to vary
by health status. In particular, since individuals with di¤erent realizations of their disability
process may face a di¤erent distribution of permanent productivity shocks, we assume that
var ( itjLit) = 2;L. The idea is that, after the realization of the disability shock, individuals
will draw shocks to their productivity from distributions with di¤erent degrees of dispersion.
Equation (2) determines the evolution of individual productivity. Productivity deter-
mines the o¤ered wage when individuals receive a job o¤er. The choice about whether or
not to accept an o¤ered wage depends in part on the xed costs of work, which in turn
depend on the extent of the work limitation, F (L) : In addition, there are labour market
frictions which means that not all individuals receive job o¤ers. First, there is job destruc-
tion, , which forces individuals into unemployment for (at least) one period. Second, job
o¤ers for the unemployed arrive at a rate  and so individuals may remain unemployed even
if they are willing to work.
This wage and employment environment implies a number of sources of risk, from in-
dividual productivity, work limitation shocks, and labor market frictions. These risks are
idiosyncratic, but we assume that there are no markets to provide insurance against these
risks. Instead, there is partial insurance coming from government insurance programs (as
detailed in the next section) and from individualsown saving and labor supply.
3.4 Social Insurance
The DI Program The Social Security Disability Insurance program (DI) is an
insurance program for covered workers, their spouses, and dependents that pays benets
related to average past earnings. The purpose of the program is to provide insurance against
persistent health shocks that impair substantially the ability to work. The di¢ culty with
providing this insurance is that health status and the impact of health on the ability to work
is imperfectly observed.
The award of disability insurance depends on the following conditions: (1) An individual
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must le an application; (2) There is a work requirement on the number of quarters of prior
employment: Workers over the age of 31 are disability-insured if they have 20 quarters of
coverage during the previous 40 quarters; (3) There is a statutory ve-month waiting period
out of the labour force from the onset of disability before an application will be processed;
and (4) the individual must meet a medical requirement, i.e. the presence of a disability
dened as Inability to engage in any substantial gainful activity by reason of any medically
determinable physical or mental impairment, which can be expected to result in death, or
which has lasted, or can be expected to last, for a continuous period of at least 12 months.10
The actual DI determination process consists of sequential steps. After excluding indi-
viduals earning more than a so-called substantial gainful amount(SGA, $900 a month for
non-blind individuals as of 2007), the SSA determine whether the individual has a medical
disability that is severe and persistent (per the denition above).11 If such disability is a
listed impairment, the individual is awarded benets without further review.12 If the appli-
cants disability does not match a listed impairment, the DI evaluators try to determine the
applicants residual functional capacity. In the last stage the pathological criterion is paired
with an economic opportunity criterion. Two individuals with identical work limitation dis-
abilities may receive di¤erent DI determination decisions depending on their age, education,
general skills, and even economic conditions faced at the time the determination is made.
In our model, we make the following assumptions in order to capture the complexities
of the disability insurance screening process. First, we require that the individuals make
the choice to apply for benets. Second, individuals have to have been at work for at least
the period prior to becoming unemployed and making the application. Third, individuals
10Despite this formal criterion changing very little, there have been large uctuations over time in the
award rates: for example, award rates fell from 48.8% to 33.3% between 1975 and 1980, but then rose again
quickly in 1984, when eligibility criteria were liberalized, and an applicants own physician reports were used
to determine eligibility. In 1999, a number of work incentive programs for DI beneciaries were introduced
(such as the Ticket to Work program) in an attempt to push some of the DI recipients back to work.
11The criteria quoted above species any substantial gainful activity: this refers to a labour supply issue.
However, it does not address the labour demand problem. Of course, if the labour market is competitive this
will not be an issue because workers can be paid their marginal product whatever their productivity level.
In the presence of imperfections, however, the wage rate associated with a job may be above the disabled
individuals marginal productivity. The Americans with Disability Act (1990) tries to address this question
but that tackles the issue only for incumbents who become disabled.
12The listed impairments are described in a blue-book published and updated periodically by the SSA
(Disability Evaluation under Social Security). The listed impairments are physical and mental conditions
for which specic disability approval criteria has been set forth or listed (for example, Amputation of both
hands, Heart transplant, or Leukemia).
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must have been unemployed for at least one quarter before applying. Successful applicants
begin receiving benets in that second quarter. Unsuccessful individuals must wait a further
quarter before being able to return to work, but there is no direct monetary cost of applying
for DI. Finally, we assume that the probability of success depends on the true work limitation
status and age:
Pr

DIit = 1jDIAppit = 1; Lit; t

=
(
Y oungL
OldL
if t < 45
if 45  t  62 (3)
We make the probability of a successful application for DI dependent on age because
the persistence of health shocks is age dependent.13 Individuals leave the disability program
either voluntarily (which in practice means into employment) or following a reassessment
of the work limitation and being found to be able to work (based on (3)). We depart from
the standard assumption made in the literature that DI is an absorbing state because we
want to be able to evaluate policies that create incentives for DI beneciaries to leave the
program. The probability of being reassessed is 0 for the rst year, then is given by PRe,
which is independent of L and age.
DI benets are calculated in essentially the same fashion as Social Security retirement
benets. Beneciaries receive indexed monthly payments equal to their Primary Insurance
Amount (PIA), which is based on taxable earnings averaged over the number of years worked
(known as AIME). Benets are independent of the extent of the work limitation, but are
progressive.14 We set the value of the benets according to the actual schedule in the US
program (see Appendix).
We assume that the government awards benets to applicants whose signal of disability
exceeds a certain stringency threshold. Some individuals whose actual disability is less severe
than the threshold may nonetheless wish to apply for DI if their productivity is su¢ ciently
low because the government only observes a noisy measure of the true disability status. In
contrast, some individuals with true disability status above the threshold may not apply
because they are highly productive despite their disability. Given the opportunity cost of
13The separation at age 45 takes also into account the practical rule followed by DI evaluators in the the
last stage of the DI determination process (the so-called Vocational Grid, see Appendix 2 to Subpart P of
Part 404 Medical-Vocational Guidelines, as summarized in Chen and van der Klaauw, 2008).
14Caps on the amount that individuals pay into the DI system as well as the nature of the formula
determining benets make the system progressive. Because of the progressivity of the benets and because
individuals receiving DI also receive Medicare benets after two years, the replacement rates are substantially
higher for workers with low earnings and those without employer-provided health insurance.
13
applying for DI, these considerations suggest that applicants will be predominantly low
productivity individuals or those with severe work limitations (see Black et al., 2004, for a
related discussion).
Supplemental Security Income (SSI) Individuals who are deemed to be dis-
abled according to the rules of the DI program and who have income (comprehensive of DI
benets but excluding the value of food stamps) below the threshold that would make them
eligible for food stamps, receive also supplemental security income (SSI). The denition of
disability in the SSI program is identical to the one for the DI program, while the denition
of low income is similar to the one used for the Food Stamps program.15 We assume that
SSI generosity is identical to the means-tested program described in the Appendix.
3.5 Solution
There is no analytical solution for our model. Instead, the model must be solved numer-
ically, beginning with the terminal condition on assets, and iterating backwards, solving at
each age for the value functions conditional on work status. The solution method is discussed
in detail in the Appendix, which also provides the code to solve and simulate the model.
4 Data
The ideal data set for studying the issues discussed in our model is a longitudinal
data set covering the entire life cycle of an individual, while at the same time containing
information on consumption, wages, employment, disability status, the decision to apply
for DI, and information on receipt of DI. Unfortunately, none of the US data sets typically
used by researchers working on DI satisfy all these requirements at once. Most of the
structural analyses of DI errors have used data from the HRS or the Survey of Income and
Program Participation (SIPP). The advantage of the HRS is that respondents are asked very
detailed questions on disability status and DI application, minimizing measurement error and
providing a direct (reduced form) way of measuring screening errors. However, there are three
important limitations of the HRS. First, the HRS samples only from a population of older
15In particular, individuals must have income below a countable income limit, which typically is slightly
below the o¢ cial poverty line (Daly and Burkhauser, 2003). As in the case of Food Stamp eligibility, SSI
eligibility also has an asset limit which we disregard.
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workers and retirees (aged above 50). In Figure 6 of the Appendix, we show that in recent
years an increasing fraction of DI awards have gone to younger individuals, which highlights
that capturing the behavior of those under 50 is an important part of our understanding
of disability insurance, as also discussed in von Wachter et al. (2011). Second, the HRS
asks questions about application to DI only to those individuals who have reported having
a work limitation at some stage in their life course. Finally, the HRS has no consumption
data. The SIPP has the advantage of being a large data set covering the entire life cycle,
but it also lacks consumption data. This is problematic because an important element of
our model is the state dependence in utility induced by health. Moreover, the longitudinal
structure of the SIPP makes it di¢ cult to link precisely the timing of wages with those of
changes in work limitations.
Our choice is to use the 1986-1996 PSID.16 The PSID o¤ers repeated, comparable an-
nual data on disability status, disability insurance recipiency, wages, employment, and food
consumption. The quality of the data is comparable to SIPP and HRS and the panel is
long. However, there are also disadvantages from using the PSID, and here we discuss how
important they are and what we do to tackle them. The rst problem is that the sample
of people likely to have access to disability insurance is small. Nevertheless, estimates of
disability rates in the PSID are similar to those obtained in other, larger data sets (CPS,
SIPP, NHIS - and HRS conditioning on age, see Bound and Burkhauser, 1999). Moreover,
PSID DI rates by age compare well with aggregate data (see the Appendix, Figure 3), and
also in the time series. For example, in the population, the proportion of people on DI has
increased from 2.4% to 4.3% between 1985 and 2005, whereas in the PSID the increase over
the same time period is from 2.4% to 4.5%.
The second problem is that consumption in the PSID refers only to food. By contrast, in
the model, the budget constraint imposes that, over the lifetime, all income is spent on (non-
durable) consumption. To compare consumption in the model to consumption in the data,
we obtain non-durable consumption in the data with an imputation procedure that uses a
regression for nondurable consumption estimated with CEX data. The imputation procedure
16Due to the retrospective nature of the questions on earnings and consumption, this means our data refer
to the 1985-1995 period. We do not use data before 1985 because major reforms in the DI screening process
were implemented in 1984 (see Autor and Duggan, 2003, and Duggan and Imberman, 2009). We do not
use data after 1996 primarily because the welfare reform of that year may have changed the nature of the
interaction among the various welfare programs, and hence also a¤ected the decision to apply for DI (see
e.g., Blank 2004).
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is described in detail in the Appendix. To summarize, there are two types of variation we use.
First, there is variation in tastes (which we capture with demographic characteristics) and
total nondurable consumption. Second, there is variation in health variables. In particular,
we use variables that in the CEX and PSID capture health status: an indicator of whether
the head is ill, disabled, or unable to work, and an indicator for receipt of DI payments.
The R2 of the imputation regression is quite high (0.75).
The third problem is that the PSID does not provide information on DI application. We
use our indirect inference procedure to circumvent this problem: For a given set of structural
parameters, we simulate DI application decisions and the resulting moments that reect the
DI application decision (such as DI recipiency by age and disability status, disability state
of DI recipients by age, and transitions into the program). These moments, crucially, can be
obtained both in the actual and simulated data and the t of these moments is an explicit
way of checking how well our model approximates the decision to apply for DI.
The PSID sample we use excludes the Latino sub-sample, female heads, and people
younger than 23 or older than 62. Further sample selection restrictions are discussed in the
Appendix.17
Disability Data We dene a discrete indicator of work limitation status (Lit), based
on the following set of questions: (1) Do you have any physical or nervous condition that
limits the type of work or the amount of work you can do? To those answering Yes, the
interviewer then asks: (2) Does this condition keep you from doing some types of work?
The possible answers are: Yes, No, or Can do nothing. Finally, to those who answer
Yesor No, the interviewer then asks: (3) For work you can do, how much does it limit
the amount of work you can do? The possible answers are: A lot, Somewhat, Just a
little, or Not at all.
17While PSID data are annual, our model assumes that the decision period is a quarter, as events like
unemployment, wage shocks, etc., happen at a frequency that is shorter than the year. We match timing in
the model with that available in the data by converting quarterly data in our simulations into the annual
frequency of the PSID. To give an example of how we do this, people report their disability state in the
PSID at the time of the interview, which typically occurs in the 2nd quarter of the year. In the simulations
disability states are updated every quarter. To create a consistent match between data and simulations, we
match 2nd quarter statistics only. Similarly, in the data DI = 1 if any DI payments were received in the
year. In the simulations, we have four DI observations per year. We set DI = 1 in the simulations if DI = 1
in any of the quarters. Hence, in both the data and the simulations, Pr(DI = 1jL = 2) is the fraction of
people who reported to be severely disabled in the second quarter and who reported to have received some
DI payments during the year.
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We assume that those without a work limitation (Lit = 0) either answer No to the
rst question or Not at allto the third question. Of those that answer Yesto the rst
question, we classify as severely limited (Lit = 2) those who answer question 2 that they
can do nothingand those that answer question 3 that they are limited a lot. The rest
have a moderate limitation (Lit = 1): their answer to question 3 is that they are limited
either somewhator just a little. This distinction between severe and moderate disability
enables us to target our measure of work limitation more closely to that intended by the
SSA.18 In particular, we interpret the SSA criterion as intending DI for the severely work
limited rather than the moderately work limited.19
The validity of work limitation self-reports is somewhat controversial for three reasons.
First, subjective reports may be poorly correlated with objective measures of disability.
However, Bound and Burkhauser (1999) survey a number of papers that show that self-
reported measures are highly correlated with clinical measures of disability. We provide
additional evidence in support of our self-reported measure of work limitation in Table 3 in
the Appendix.
Second, individuals may over-estimate their work limitation in order to justify their dis-
ability payments or their non-participation in the labour force. Benitez-Silva et al. (2004)
show that self-reports are unbiased predictors of the denition of disability used by the
SSA (norms). In other words, there is little evidence that, for the sample of DI appli-
cants, average disability rates as measured from the self-reports are signicantly higher than
disability rates as measured from the SSA nal decision rules. However, Kreider (1999)
provides evidence based on bound identication that disability is over-reported among the
unemployed.
Third, health status may be endogenous, and non-participation in the labour force may
a¤ect health (either positively or negatively). Stern (1990) and Bound (1991) both nd pos-
18Our three-way classication uses the responses to the multiple questions (1)-(3), and hence reduces
the measurement error associated with using just the "Yes/No" responses associated to question (1). An
alternative way to reduce such error is to classify as disabled only those who answer "Yes" to question (1)
for two consecutive years, as in Burkhauser and Daly (1996).
19The distinction between moderate and severe disability is a key step in achieving identication of the
error rates in the DI application process. However, our distinction does not take into account that the
vocational criterion of DI implies that eligibility potentially varies across time and space for workers with
similar disabilities because of market conditions. On the other hand, as noticed by Benitez-Silva et al. (2004),
these measures have the unique advantage of being su¢ cient statistics for use in the structural modeling of
individual behavior under disability risk.
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itive e¤ects of non-participation on health, but the e¤ects are economically small. Further,
Smith (2004) nds that income does not a¤ect health once one controls for education (as
we do implicitly by focusing on a group of homogenous individuals with similar schooling
levels). Similarly, Adda et al. (2009) nd that innovations to income have negligible e¤ect
on health.
Sample Summary Statistics Table 1 reports descriptive statistics for our sample,
stratifying it by the degree of work limitations. The severely disabled are older and less likely
to be married or white. They have lower family income but higher income from transfers
(most of which come from the DI or SSI program). They are less likely to work, have lower
earnings if they do so, are more likely to be a DI recipient, and have lower food spending
than people without a disability.
These statistics underpin the moments used in the indirect inference estimation. Two
particularly important descriptive statistics are the fraction of DI recipients who are not
severely disabled (false claimants) and the fraction of individuals with a severe disability
who receive DI (coverage). Figure 1 plots the life cycle patterns for each: the fraction
of claimants who are healthy is particularly high early in the life cycle, while coverage
becomes more e¤ective at the end of the working life cycle.
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Table 1: Sample Summary Statistics by Work
Limitation Status
L = 0 L = 1 L = 2
Age 38.41 43.99 47.74
% Married 0.82 0.82 0.73
% White 0.62 0.70 0.54
Family size 3.24 3.23 2.97
Family income 46,418 41,204 25,623
Income from transfers 1,772 5,381 10,365
% Working now 0.91 0.64 0.15
% Annual wages > 0 0.96 0.73 0.19
HoursjHours>0 2,158 1,935 1,487
WagesjHours>0 31,048 26,701 17,213
Hourly wage 14.85 14.34 12.53
% DI recipient 0.01 0.14 0.47
Food spending 5,645 5,469 4,160
Number of obs. 12,820 1,102 878
Note: monetary values are in 1996 dollars.
5 Identication and Results
Identication of the unknown parameters proceeds in three steps. First, some para-
meters are pre-determined or calibrated using established ndings from the literature. We
check the sensitivity of our policy experiment results to assuming di¤erent values for key
pre-determined parameters. Second, some parameters are estimated outside the structure of
the model. For some parameters, this is because no structure is needed: disability risk can
be estimated directly from transitions between disability states because of the exogeneity
assumption. For other parameters, we use a reduced form approach to reduce the computa-
tional burden when there are plausible selection correction processes, as is the case for the
wage parameters. The remaining parameters are estimated structurally using an Indirect
Inference procedure.
This mixed identication strategy is not novel to our paper. For example, to make
estimation feasible, Bound, Stinebrickner and Waidmann (2010) estimate, in a context very
similar to ours, the parameters of the earnings equations and health equations outside the
behavioral model. This mixed strategy has been used more generally in a number of papers
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looking at consumption choices under uncertainty: Gourinchas and Parker (2000); Attanasio
et al. (1999); Low et al. (2010); Alan and Browning (2009); and Guvenen and Smith (2011).
5.1 Pre-determined and calibrated parameters
We x the relative risk aversion coe¢ cient  and the intertemporal discount rate  to
realistic values estimated elsewhere in the literature. In principle, one could identify  and
 using asset data. During the sample period we use, however, data on assets are available
only for two waves, 1989 and 1994. Instead, we use these limited asset data to test the
out-of-sample behavior of our model.
We set  = 1:5 in our baseline and we later examine the sensitivity of our results to setting
 = 3.20 As for the estimate of , we use the central value of estimates from Gourinchas
and Parker (2000) and Cagetti (2003), two representative papers of the literature and set
 = 0:025.21 In principle, the arrival rate of o¤ers when unemployed () parameter could be
identied using unemployment duration by age. This is the strategy taken in Low, Meghir
and Pistaferri (2010), and thus we use their estimate of a quarterly arrival rate  = 0:73.
DI beneciaries have their disability reassessed periodically through Continuing Disabil-
ity Reviews (CDR).22 To obtain an estimate of the reassessment probability we use aggre-
gate statistics. During the scal years 1987-1996, the SSA conducted a total of 1,777,277
CDRs. Using the stock of disabled workers in receipt of DI, we calculate a probability of
re-assessment PRe = 0:0613.23
Finally, we set the interest factor to a realistic value, R = 1:016 (on an annual basis),
and assume that a life-span is 50 years, from age 22, with the last 10 years in compulsory
retirement.
20Attanasio et al. (1999), Blundell et al. (1994), Attanasio and Weber (1995), and Banks et al. (2001),
report estimates of 1, 1.35, 1.37, 1.5, and 1.96 respectively. Our choice  = 1:5 is a central value of these
estimates.
21Both use annual data and we convert their annual discount rate in a quarterly discount rate. The
estimates we use from their papers refer to their low education (high school or less) sample. The Gourinchas
and Parkers estimate is 0.012; Cagettis estimates range between 0.013 and 0.051 depending on the denition
of wealth, the data set used (PSID and SCF), and whether mean or median assets are used.
22By law, the SSA is expected to perform CDRs every 7 years for individuals with medical improvement
not expected, every 3 years for individuals with medical improvement possible, and every 6 to 18 months
for individuals with medical improvement expected. In practice, the actual number of CDRs performed is
lower.
23While we could use transitions out of the DI program as moments to identify PRe, these moments are
very noisy.
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5.2 Disability Risk
Disability risk is independent of any choices made by individuals in our model, and is
also independent of productivity shocks. This means that the disability risk process can
be identied structurally without indirect inference. By contrast, the same is not true for
the variance of wage shocks: because wages are observed only for workers, wage shocks are
identied using a selection correction.
In principle, since we have three possible work limitation states, there are nine pos-
sible transition patterns Pr (Lit = jjLit 1 = k). These are reported in full detail in the
Appendix. Here (Figure 2) we plot only selected estimates of the transition probabilities
Pr (Lit = jjLit 1 = k).24 These estimates are informative about work limitation risk. For ex-
ample, Pr (Lit = 2jLit 1 = 0) is the probability that an individual with no work limitations is
hit by a shock that puts him in the severe work limitation category. Whether this is a persis-
tent or temporary transition can be assessed by looking at the value of Pr (Lit = 2jLit 1 = 2).
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Figure 2: Selected transitions
The top left panel of Figure 2 plots Pr (Lit = 0jLit 1 = 0), i.e. the probabilities of staying
24To obtain these plots, we rst construct a variable that equals the mid-point of a 10-age band (23-32,
33-42, etc.), call it mid-age. We then regress an indicator for the joint event fLit = j; Lit 1 = kg on a
quadratic in the mid-age variable, conditioning on the event fLit 1 = kg (that is, focusing on the sample of
individuals with fLit 1 = kg). The predicted value of this regression is what we plot in the gure.
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healthy by age. This probability declines over the working part of the life cycle from 0.96 to
about 0.88. The decline is equally absorbed by increasing probabilities of transiting in mod-
erate and severe work limitations. The top right panel plots the latter, Pr (Lit = 2jLit 1 = 0).
This probability increases over the working life, and the increase is fast: from 1% to almost
4%. The probability of full recovery following a severe disability (shown in the bottom left
panel) declines over the life-cycle. Finally, the probability of persistent severe work limita-
tions, Pr (Lit = 2jLit 1 = 2) (bottom right panel) increases strongly with age (from about
0.5 to about 0.7).25
5.3 The Wage Process and Productivity Risk
We augment the wage process (2) to include an additional error term !it:
lnwit = X
0
it+ '11fLit = 1g+ '21fLit = 2g+ "it + !it (4)
with "it = "it 1 +  it as before. We assume that !it reects measurement error. We do this
because measurement error is not separately identiable from transitory shocks. Despite the
lack of transitory shocks in wages, there will be transitory shocks to earnings because of
the frictions which induce temporary loss of income for a given productivity level. We make
the assumption that the two errors  it and !it are independent.
26 Our goal is to identify
the variance of the productivity shock 2;L (for L = f0; 1; 2g) as well as '1 and '2. A rst
complication is selection e¤ects because wages are not observed for those who do not work
and the decision to work depends on the wage o¤er. Further, the employment decision may
depend directly on disability shocks as well as on the expectation that the individual will
apply for DI in the subsequent period (which requires being unemployed in the current
period). We observe neither these expectations, nor the decision to apply.
Our selection correction is based on a reduced form rather than on our structural model,
although the structural model is consistent with the reduced form.27 We assume that po-
25Low educated individuals face worse health risk than high educated individuals, with higher probabilities
of bad shocks occurring and a lower probability of recovery (see Figure 10 in the Appendix). These di¤erences
across education, alongside the much greater prevalence of DI among the low educated, are the reasons why
we focus our analysis on the subsample of individuals with low education.
26Based on evidence from e.g., Bound and Krueger (1995), we assume that the measurement error !it
may be potentially serially correlated (an MA(1) process).
27Estimating the wage process jointly with preferences and DI parameters is computationally burdensome,
as it would require adding seven additional parameters.
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tential government transfers and the interaction of potential government transfers with
disability status serve as exclusion restrictions. The interaction account for the fact that the
disincentive to work that government transfers are intending to capture may be di¤erent for
people who have a physical cost to work. Potentialtransfers are the sum of food stamps
benets, AFDC benets, EITC benets, and unemployment insurance benets individuals
would receive in case of program application. These potential benets are computed using
the formulae coded in the federal (for food stamps and EITC) and state (for AFDC and UI)
legislation of the programs.28 The use of this variable is in the spirit of the simulated IV
literature in empirical public nance. In general, realized public income transfers are en-
dogenous because the individuals take-up decision is a choice. Since the parameters behind
these public programs are exogenous, however, we use the amount of benets individuals are
potentially eligible for (before any take up decision is made).29
In Table 2 column (1) we report marginal e¤ects from a probit regression for employment.
Throughout the exercise, standard errors are clustered at the individual level. Employment
is monotonically decreasing in the degree of work limitations. Absent potential transfers,
the probability of working declines by 23 percentage points at the onset of a moderate work
limitation, and by 74 percentage points at the onset of a severe work limitation. Regarding
our exclusion restrictions, the signs are correct: higher (potential) income from transfers
induced by a more generous welfare system increase the opportunity cost of work, and the
e¤ects are statistically signicant. We also nd that for individuals with some disabilities
this opportunity cost e¤ect is smaller, consistent with the idea that lack of work among the
disabled may not always reect an option valueargument. We will revisit this important
issue in the policy experiment section.
Estimation of the probit for employment allows us to construct an estimate of the inverse
Millsratio term. We then estimate the wage equation only on the sample of workers. The
resulting estimates of '1 and '2; with the selection correction through the inverse Mills
28We ignore asset limits on Food Stamps and AFDC since we have data on assets only for two waves. Full
details on how we construct potential benets for these four programs are in the Appendix.
29To check the robustness of our ndings, in the online Appendix we report results under a variety of
di¤erent exclusion restrictions, including (a) received (public and private) transfers, (b) an index of generosity
of the local UI program; and (c) interactions of state and year dummies to capture reforms to local welfare
systems. We nd that the use of these di¤erent exclusion restrictions induce only small changes in the e¤ect
of disability variables on wages and virtually no e¤ects on the estimated variances of the permanent shock
(the only structural parameters in this exercise). Our results are also robust to using lagged wages or sample
average wages when computing potential transfers.
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Table 2: The Log Wage Equation
Variable Employment Wage w/out Wage with
equation selection selection
(1) (2) (3)
1fLit = 1g  0:225
(0:026)
 0:160
(0:034)
 0:211
(0:044)
1fLit = 2g  0:738
(0:031)
 0:262
(0:052)
 0:470
(0:136)
Potential transfers  0:091
(0:012)
Potential transfers1 fLit = 1g 0:037
(0:020)
Potential transfers1 fLit = 2g 0:041
(0:023)
Mills ratio 0:176
(0:106)
N 14,800 13,332 13,332
Note: Clustered standard errors in parenthesis. *,**,*** = signicant at 10, 5,
and 1 percent, respectively.
ratio, should be interpreted as the estimates of the e¤ect of work limitations on o¤ered
wages.
In columns (2) and (3) of Table 2, we report estimates of the log wage process with and
without correcting for endogenous selection into work. The key coe¢ cients are the ones on
fL = 1g and fL = 2g ; which are estimates of '1 and '2; the e¤ect of the work limitation
on wages. A moderate work limitation reduces the observed wage rate by 16 percentage
points, whereas a severe limitation reduces the o¤ered wage by 26 percentage points. The
selection correction to recover the o¤ered wage from the observed wage makes a substantial
di¤erence. The e¤ect of a severe work limitation on the observed wage is 20 percentage
points less than on the o¤ered wage: those who remain at work despite their work limitation
have higher-than-average permanent income.30 This is conrmed by the positive sign of the
Mills ratio.
30We check that our results do not depend on the normality assumption. In the online Appendix we repeat
our wage equation estimates using a non-parametric approach. In the rst step we estimate a univariate
employment model using the semi-nonparametric estimator of Gallant and Nychka (1987) and save the pre-
dicted value bsit. In the second step, we estimate our wage regression controlling for a 2nd degree polynomial
in bsit. We nd that the results remain very similar.
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Table 3: Variances of the Productivity Shocks
Parameter 2;L=2 
2
;L=1 
2
;L=0
Estimate 0:110
(0:048)
0:041
(0:021)
0:016
(0:007)
P-value test 2;L=2 = 
2
;L=0 5.1%
Note: Clustered standard errors in parenthesis. *,**,*** = signicant
at 10, 5, and 1 percent, respectively.
Productivity Risk To identify the variance of productivity shocks, we dene rst
the adjustederror term:
git = 
 
lnwit  X 0it 
2X
j=1
'jL
j
it
!
=  it +!it (5)
From estimation of , '1 and '2 described above we can construct the adjustedresid-
uals, and use them as they were the true adjusted error terms (5) (MaCurdy, 1982). We
can then identify the variance of productivity shocks by health status and the variance of
measurement error using the rst and second moments and the autocovariances of git (con-
ditioning on disability status), as discussed fully in the Appendix. The identication idea is
simple. Neglect for a moment the issue of selection. With measurement error, the variance
of git reects two sources of innovations: permanent productivity shocks and measurement
error. The autocovariances identify the contribution of measurement errors (which are mean-
reverting), and hence the variance of productivity shocks is identied by stripping from the
variance of wage growth the contribution of measurement error. Without selection, second
moments conditional on working would just reect variances of shocks. With selection, con-
ditional variances are less than unconditional variances (which are the parameters of interest)
by a factor that depends on the degree of selection in the data. First conditional moments
help pin down the latter. See the Appendix for a formal proof.
The results are in Table 3. As before, we report standard errors clustered at the individual
level. The estimates of the variance of productivity shocks vary by health status. We nd
that work limitations increase the dispersion of shocks, making the likelihood of more extreme
realizations of productivity shocks higher when people become work limited.
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5.4 Identication of Preferences and Disability Insurance Para-
meters
Identication of the remaining structural parameters of interest (; ; ; FL=0; FL=1; FL=2)
and the DI policy parameters (Y oungL=0 ; 
Y oung
L=1 ; 
Y oung
L=2 ; 
Old
L=0; 
Old
L=1; 
Old
L=2) is achieved by Indi-
rect Inference (see Gourieroux et al, 1993).31 Indirect inference relies on matching moments
from an approximate model (known as auxiliary model) which can be estimated on both
real and simulated data, rather than on moments from the correct data generating process.
The moments of the auxiliary model are related (through a so-called binding function) to
the structural parameters of interest. The latter are estimated by minimizing the distance
between the moments of the auxiliary model estimated from the observed data and the mo-
ments of the auxiliary model estimated from the simulated data. Any bias in estimates of the
auxiliary model on actual data will be mirrored by bias in estimates of the auxiliary model
on simulated data, under the null that the structural model is correctly specied. How-
ever, the closer the link between the moments of the auxiliary equations and the structural
parameters, the more reliable is estimation.
How to choose which auxiliary moments to match? In our theoretical model, individuals
make three decisions: how much to consume, whether to work, and whether to apply for
DI. We choose auxiliary moments that reect the choices individuals make.32 In particular,
we use: (1) a regression of log consumption on work limitation, disability insurance, em-
ployment (and interactions), controlling for a number of other covariates; (2) employment
rates, conditional on disability status and age; (3) the stock of recipients of DI, conditional
on disability status and age; (4) the DI status of people of di¤erent age and health status;
and (5) the ows into the DI program by age and disability status. These choices give us 36
moments overall, which we discuss next.
Moments: Disability Insurance There are three ways in which we calculate mo-
ments involving DI recipients. First, we consider the composition of DI recipients by health
status. This identies the fraction of DI recipients who are not truly disabled and helps to
31Indirect Inference is a generalization of the more traditional method of simulated moments, MSM, or
the E¢ cient Method of Moments, EMM. Indirect Inference is becoming a standard estimation method in
analyses of the type we conduct in our papers. See for recent examples Alan and Browning (2009); Guvenen
and Smith (2011); Altonji, Smith and Vidangos (2011).
32We do not have data on DI application, and hence use moments reecting participation in the DI
program.
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pin down the incentive cost of the program. Second, we consider the DI status of individuals
within work limitation-types. For the severely work limited, this identies the fraction of the
truly needy who benet from DI. Third, we consider the ow rates onto DI by individuals
within work limitation types.
These moments can be directly related to the probabilities of a successful application,
the structural parameters of the DI program. Information on stocks on DI and ows into
DI is the kind of variability in the data that we use to identify success probabilities by type
(age and health status). Intuitively, a higher probability of success for a given type would
generate higher ows into the program and larger stocks on DI for that type. For example,
consider how we use the fraction of those with a severe limitation not on DI who move
onto DI to help identify OldL=2. The fraction we observe, and use as auxiliary moment, is
Fr (DIt = 1jDIt 1 = 0; L = 2; Old). We can show that:
Fr (DIt = 1jDIt 1 = 0; L = 2; Old) = Pr
 
DIt = 1jDIt 1 = 0; L = 2; Old;DIApp = 1

Pr

DIAppt = 1jDIt 1 = 0; L = 2; Old

= OldL=2 Pr

DIAppt = 1jDIt 1 = 0; L = 2; Old

(6)
The observed fraction would be particularly informative if all L = 2 individuals applied
(i.e., if Pr

DIAppt = 1jDIt 1 = 0; L = 2; Old

= 1). However, because not everyone applies,
the moment we use (the left hand side of (6)) is a lower bound on the probability of ac-
ceptance, the structural parameter of interest. To move from a bound on the probability
of acceptance to the actual probability requires a model of the application decision, which
will itself be a¤ected by the probabilities of acceptance, as well as the availability of other
insurance programs and wage o¤ers.
Consider the following example: the ow fraction Fr (DIt = 1jDIt 1 = 0; L = 2; Old) =
0:21 in the data. Suppose we start the iteration with OldL=2 = 0:1. This probability will not
match the data regardless of what the application probability is. Since the probability of
applying for DI is not greater than 1, it is clear that OldL=2 must exceed 0:21 to make sense of
the data, and this is indeed the area where the algorithm will search. For any value of OldL=2,
the structural model simulates a di¤erent Pr

DIAppt = 1jDIt 1 = 0; L = 2; Old

, where at
the margin more people apply as OldL=2 increases. If the fraction (6) were the only moment to
match, the algorithmwould pick the OldL=2 such that 
Old
L=2 Pr

DIAppt = 1jDIt 1 = 0; L = 2; Old

27
is as close as possible to 0.21. In practice, the probabilities and application rates also a¤ect
the stock of DI recipients, which are more precisely measured, but which are a¤ected by the
ows o¤ DI and by changes in health status over time. We use both ows and stocks by
work limitation status as our auxiliary moments.
Moments: Consumption Regression A work limitation is likely to have two sepa-
rate e¤ects on consumption: rst, the work limitation a¤ects earnings and hence consumption
through the budget constraint. The size of this e¤ect will depend on the persistence of the
shock and the extent of insurance, both self-insurance and formal insurance mechanisms such
as DI. The second e¤ect of the work limitation is through non-separabilities in the utility
function (measured by the parameter  in (1)). For example, if being disabled increases the
marginal utility of consumption (e.g. through increased needs) then consumption will rise
on disability even if there is full insurance and marginal utility is smoothed over states of
disability. It is important to separate out these two e¤ects. Stephens (2001) calculates the
e¤ect of the onset of disability on consumption, but does not distinguish whether the e¤ect
is through non-separability or through the income loss directly.
The identication of  comes from a regression of consumption on work limitation. Of
course, the presence of income/budget constraint e¤ects means this does not identify the non-
separability e¤ect . However, if we can identify a (control) group of individuals who are
fully insured against disability shocks, then the consumption response to the work limitation
for those individuals should capture only preference e¤ects. We assume that people who are
in receipt of DI represent such group.33
Our method for separating out the two e¤ects is to use the parameters of the following
auxiliary regression:
ln cit = 0 + 1L
1
it + 2L
2
it + 3L
1
itDIit + 4L
2
itDI + 5DIit
+6Pit + 7t+ 8t
2 + it
33The extent of insurance from DI obviously depends on being admitted onto the program, but conditional
on receiving DI, the extent of insurance is greater for low income individuals because replacement rates for
our low educated sample can be fairly high: (1) DI payments are progressive (the replacement rate is about
85% for people at the 25th percentile of the AIME distribution, and about 65% at the median); (2) DI
covers medical expenses through the Medicare program after two years on the program; (3) unlike wages,
benets are untaxed up to a certain limit; (4) lifetime replacement rates may potentially be higher because
DI payments are received with certainty while employment is random due to labor market frictions.
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The e¤ect of a (severe) work limitation on consumption for individuals who are not in
receipt of DI is given by the parameter 2. This captures both the income e¤ect and the non-
separability e¤ect. For individuals who are in receipt of DI, however, the e¤ect of a severe
disability on consumption is (2 + 4) : If DI provided full insurance, (2 + 4) would capture
the e¤ect of the non-separability, with the parameter 4 negating the income e¤ect in 2. The
split between 2 and 4 is less clear if insurance is partial; in which case (2 + 4) captures
both the non-separable part and the lack of full insurance for those receiving DI. Indirect
inference exploits this identication intuition without putting a structural interpretation
directly on the  parameters. The coe¢ cients 1 and 3 correspond to the e¤ects of a
moderate disability. We use an adult-equivalent measure of consumption and control for a
quadratic in age to account for life-cycle evolution of family composition and tastes.34 35
Employment can also provide insurance against disability shocks. In addition, employ-
ment has a direct e¤ect on the marginal utility of consumption (the parameter ). We use
the auxiliary parameter 6 to help capture this non-separability between consumption and
labor supply. Intuitively, whether consumption and employment covary positively or nega-
tively (controlling for health status and point on the life cycle) is informative about whether
they are Frisch complements or substitutes in utility.
Moments: Employment Rates over the Life-Cycle We calculate employment
rates by age and by work limitation status, using four 10-year age bands: 23-32, 33-42,
43-52, and 53-62. The moments that we use are the employment rates for the three work
limitation groups in each age band, giving 12 moments overall. These moments are related
to xed cost of work with di¤erent work limitations, F (L) ; the utility cost of working, ;
and the labor market frictions.
In particular, unemployment rates among the healthy in the early life cycle are informa-
tive about the job destruction rate  because assets are very low at young ages and so very
few decide voluntarily not to work. The di¤erences in employment by disability status is
34Our measure of consumption is per adult equivalent (using the OECD equivalence scale 1+0:7 (A  1)+
0:5K, where A is the number of adults and K the number of children in the household).
35We need to add two caveats to our identication strategy. First, as stressed by Meyer and Mok (2008),
consumption is measured at the family level, but we observe changes in disability at the individual level.
To partly account for this, we use a measure of adult equivalent consumption. The second caveat is that
disability insurance is only one form of insurance against disability risk (SSI and workerscompensation being
others). We replicated the regression reported in section B of Table 4 using a more comprehensive measure
of insurance against disability risk (comprising DI, SSI and WC) and nd qualitatively similar results.
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informative about the extent that work is more costly for disabled than for healthy workers
and thus how the xed cost of work di¤ers by work limitation status.
5.5 Indirect Inference Results
In this section we present results on the moments matched by Indirect Inference in Table
4, and the estimates of the structural parameters in Table 5. For each targeted moment,
we present its value in the data, its simulated value (evaluated at the estimated structural
parameters), and the 95% condence interval of the di¤erence between the value in the data
and that in the simulation.36 Targeted moments are divided into ve panels: consumption
moments, employment moments, DI coverage moments, moments related to the composition
of DI recipients, and DI ows moments.
Starting with Panel A, we nd that our auxiliary model estimates of the consumption
regression suggest that consumption falls when people become disabled and there is no
insurance. However, those who are insured against the disability shock (those who are
receiving DI) increase their consumption, consistent with the idea that consumption and
poor health are Frisch complements ( < 0 in our utility specication). This may arise, for
example, because a disability that induces a work limitation may also reduce an individuals
opportunities for home production, such as in preparing food, housework and in accessing
the cheapest shops. These auxiliary regression results are very closely replicated by our
simulated moments. None of the health and DI-related moments are statistically di¤erent
in the data relative to the simulations. 37
Turning to Panel B, the model is capable of matching well the employment behavior of
people with severe and moderate disabilities, but it does not t perfectly well the employment
behavior of older non-disabled workers.38 Nevertheless, the di¤erences appear economically
36We compute standard errors of the auxiliary moments estimated in the data by the block bootstrap.
Call sbdata this standard error. The standard error of the di¤erence
bdata   bsims is computed (using
asymptotic results) as:
q 
1 + 1S

s2bdata , where S is the number of simulations (S = 40 in our case).
37We repeated our consumption regression using food data and nd qualitatively very similar results as
far as the non-separability issue between consumption and health is concerned. The results also remain
qualitatively similar if we control for individual xed e¤ects (see Table 9 in the Appendix for both sets of
results).
38Some of the employment rejections are due to the fact that the employment proportions are very high
and hence even small di¤erences get magnied by small standard errors. For example, in the data the
fraction of 33-42 years old who work is 94.6%, while we simulate it to be 91%. However, even if we had
simulated an economically undistinguishable 93.5%, we would still have found a statistical rejection of the
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small and not systematic (the model underpredicts employment at age 33-42 and overpredicts
it in the last 10 years before retirement).39 We also notice that these discrepancies arise
for the group of healthy individuals that for the most part is una¤ected by the type of
policy experiments we are going to run later. It would have been much more worrying for
the credibility of our policy experiments if the discrepancies between data and model had
emerged for groups (those with moderate or severe disabilities) whose behavior is most likely
a¤ected by changes in benet generosity or screening procedures.
In Panel C and D we look at the two sides of the insurance/disincentives trade-o¤ of DI.
Our model is capable of matching almost all the moments with great accuracy. For example,
it matches quite closely the proportions of false recipients, Fr(L = 0jDI = 1; t) ; as well as
the proportion of workers insuredby the DI program, Fr(DI = 1jL = 2; t), which are the
reduced form equivalents of the incentive cost/insurance benet tradeo¤. In the nal Panel
E we examine the ows into the program by work limitation and age. Once more, the model
ts these moments quite well statistically.
In Table 5 we report the Indirect Inference parameter estimates corresponding to these
moments. We estimate that a moderate (severe) disability induces about a 22% (44%) loss
of utility in terms of consumption. Working induces a 20% loss. The xed costs of work
per quarter rise substantially with the degree of work limitation. We estimate that a job is
destroyed on average every 15 quarters. The probability of success of DI application increases
with age and disability status. The estimates of the success probabilities by type (age and
work limitation status) provide information on the extent of type I and type II errors, which
we discuss further in the next section. All estimates are statistically signicant except for the
probabilities of success among those without any work limitation at all, which are however
economically insignicant.
null of no di¤erence given a standard error of 0.005.
39One exception is employment among very young people reporting a moderate disability. In the data,
only 72% work, while in the model 86% do. In the simulations, these individuals have low acceptance rates
onto DI and no assets, and so they must work in order to nance their consumption. In reality, they may
have access to sources of support that we do not explicitly model - such as insurance provided by parents or
other relatives.
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Table 5: Estimated Parameters
Frictions and Preferences Disability Insurance Program
Parameter Estimate Parameter Estimate
 Cost of disability  0:224
(0:051)
Y oungL=0 0:004
(0:485)
 Cost of part.  0:197
(0:053)
OldL=0 0:0095
(0:409)
 Job destruction 0:068
(0:027)
Y oungL=1 0:148

(0:078)
OldL=1 0:148

(0:041)
FL=0 Fixed cost 0:0002
(0:046)
[$0] Y oungL=2 0:232

(0:029)
FL=1 Fixed cost 0:276
(0:108)
[$839] OldL=2 0:510

(0:078)
FL=2 Fixed cost 0:524
(0:056)
[$1592]
Note: Fixed costs are reported as the fraction of average o¤ered wage income
at age 23 and also in 1992 dollars per quarter. Standard errors in parenthesis
(see the Appendix for denitions). *,**,*** = signicant at 10, 5, and 1 percent,
respectively.
5.6 Implications
In this section we discuss the implications of our estimates for the success of the DI screening
process, for behavioral responses to DI program parameters, and the extent of self-insurance.
We also show the importance of our estimates about the role of work limitations. We compare
predictions of our model with evidence from the predominantly reduced form literature. This
is a way to verify that the model can reproduce statistics about the DI program that were
not explicitly targeted by the estimation procedure (external validity).
5.6.1 Success of the DI Screening Process
One important issue is to evaluate the success rate of the existing DI Screening Process.
We rst look at the award rate at the point of entry in the system (i.e., award of initial
application). We simulate this rate (using our structural model and estimated parameters)
to be 0.34. French and Song (2010) use administrative SSA data on the outcome of DI appli-
cations and report a very similar success rate for the initial application (0.39). In practice,
applicants who are rejected can appeal at four di¤erent successive levels: DDS reconsider-
ation, Administrative Law Judges (ALJ), Federal Court, and at the Council Review level.
While we do not model the appeal process formally, we do allow individuals to re-apply for
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DI following rejections. This allows us to compare award rates in the short and long run in
the model and in reality. According to French and Song (2011) the award rate after 2 years
from the initial application is 53% (52% in our model); after 4 years is 61% (and is the same
in our model); and after 10 years is 67% (74% in our model). Hence, our model captures
quite well short- and long-run award rates.
Those reported above are unconditional award rates (i.e., they do not condition on the
applicants health). Given that the true disability status of an applicant is private infor-
mation, SSA evaluators are likely to commit two types of errors: Admitting onto the DI
program undeserved applicants and rejecting those who are truly disabled. Our structural
estimates of the success rates show how large these errors are. Consider rst the extent of
false positives (the proportion of healthy applicants who receive DI). From Table 5, these
type II errors have probabilities ranging from 0.4% (young non disabled) to 15% (those
with a moderate disability). Similarly, we can use our model to estimate the Award Er-
ror: the fraction of successful applicants to DI who are not severely disabled, given by
Pr(L = f0; 1gjDI = 1; DIApp = 1) = 0:157. In the literature, one nds reduced form esti-
mates that are fairly similar, 0.16 to 0.22 in Benitez-Silva et al. (1999), depending on the
statistical assumptions made, and 0.19 in Nagi (1969).
Consider next the probability of false negatives (i.e., the proportion of severely disabled
who apply and do not receive DI). From Table 5, our estimate is that the type I errors are
77% for the younger and 49% for the older workers. The fraction of rejected applicants
who are disabled, the Rejection Error, is given by Pr(L = 2jDI = 0; DIApp = 1) = 0:574.
This is again similar to Benitez-Silva et al. (1999), who report 0.52-0.58, and Nagi (1969),
0.48. These comparisons conrm that our structural model is capable of replicating reduced
form estimates obtained using direct information on the application and award process.
Taken together, these estimates suggest substantial ine¢ ciencies in providing coverage for
the severely work limited, but less ine¢ ciencies in terms of identifying false claimants.40
40One caveat to this conclusion is the possibility of non-classical measurement error. This might arise for
example if people tend to exaggerate their report of work limitations if in receipt of DI or unemployed.
If that was the case, our estimates of type I error will be overestimated and our estimates of type II error
underestimated.
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5.6.2 Elasticities
The reduced form literature on DI has attempted to establish the incentive cost of DI by
looking at a number of behavioral responses, in particular the response of DI application and
labor force participation (or employment) to an increase in generosity of the DI program. In
Table 6 we report elasticity estimates from representative papers in the literature (surveyed
in the authoritative survey of Bound and Burkhauser, 1999) and we compare these estimates
with those that we can compute in our model. These are obtained by simulating individual
response as we marginally change the generosity of the DI program.
In column 1 we report the elasticity of DI applications with respect to benet generosity.
As surveyed by Bound and Burkhauser (1999), empirical analyses using aggregate time
series data from the 1960s and 1970s (such as Halpern, 1979; Lando et al., 1979) in general
tend to nd smaller elasticities (around 0.5) than those obtained from cross-sectional data
(such as Kreider, 1998, and Halpern and Hausman, 1986), which however display more
variability. A central estimate from Table 13 of Bound and Burkhauser (1999) is about 0.6
(with a 0.2-1.3 range). Our estimate (using all individuals) is 0.45. However, this gure
masks considerable heterogeneity by health. The moderately disabled are very elastic in
their response to generosity (1.11), whereas the severely disabled have very little response
(0.12). As we shall see, this di¤erence plays an important role when assessing the welfare
implications of changing DI benets generosity.
The second column shows the elasticity of the non-employment rate with respect to
benet generosity. In the literature, the response of non-employment to benets is generally
estimated to be smaller than the response of DI applications. For example, the range of
estimates reported by Bound and Burkhauser (1999) in their Table 16 and by Haveman and
Wolfe (2000) in their Table 10 is between 0.06 and 0.93. In our model this elasticity is on the
lower end of the range of estimates from the literature (our estimate is 0.12). We also break
our sample by work limitation and nd a di¤erential e¤ect on the moderately and severely
disabled: the moderately disabled are more sensitive but the di¤erences are small except for
the under 40s. For moderately work limited under 40, the elasticity is about 0.24, whereas
for the severely disabled, the elasticity remains close to zero.
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Table 6: Relevant Reduced Form Elasticities
Elasticities
DI Application Non-Employment
w.r.t. DI generosity w.r.t. DI generosity
(1) (2)
Range of estimates from lit. 0:2  1:3 0:06  0:93
Our model:
All Individuals 0:45 0:12
Mod. disab. L = 1 1:11 0:049
Sev. disab. L = 2 0:12 0:011
Note: The range of estimates from the literature in column (1) come from
Bound and Burkhauser (1999, Table 13); those in column (2) from Bound and
Burkhauser (1999, Table 16) and Haveman and Wolfe (2000, Table 10).
Table 7: Flows o¤DI
Moment Data Simul. 95% C.I. di¤erence
Fr(DIt = 0jDIt 1 = 1; t < 45) 0:137
(0:035)
0.089 ( 0:021; 0:117)
Fr(DIt = 0jDIt 1 = 1; t  45) 0:080
(0:015)
0.062 ( 0:012; 0:048)
Note: Block bootstrap s.e. in parenthesis. An asterisk indicates a statisti-
cally insignicant di¤erence (at 5 percent level).
5.6.3 Flows o¤DI
We use our model to simulate the rate of ows o¤ the DI program by work limitation
status, and we compare these to rates in the data. We did not use these rates in the estimation
because these moments are imprecisely estimated given the size of our sample. However, we
reproduce in Table 7 the main annual ow statistics and the simulated counterparts as an
indication of the performance of the model. Simulated ows o¤DI match the decline by age
observed in the data. The di¤erence between actual and simulated outows is statistically
insignicant.
5.6.4 Asset Accumulation
An important part of the model is individualsability to self-insure through asset ac-
cumulation. Unfortunately, it is di¢ cult to compare asset accumulation when there is only
one liquid asset available (as in the model), with data where individuals have both liquid
nancial wealth (bank deposits and stocks) as well as illiquid assets (housing and pension
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wealth). It is precisely for this reason that we use data on consumption and income, rather
than assets, in our estimation. Moreover, during the sample period covered by our data,
asset information was asked only at ve year intervals (in 1989 and 1994). However, we can
still compare simulated lifecycle asset proles and health-specic asset transitions with those
we obtain in the data as a form of external validation.
Our denition of assets in the data includes both housing wealth and liquid nancial
wealth.41 Median asset holdings around retirement (in the ve age interval centered at 60)
in the simulations are close to the data both for the healthy and for the work limited: for
the severely work limited, median asset holdings are 2.9 times median earnings in the data
and 3.7 times in the simulations; for the healthy, the median is 4.9 times median earnings
in the data and 5.2 times in the simulations.42 Another useful statistics is wealth dynamics
by health status. We regress the 5-year change in wealth against a quadratic in age, and
dummies for severe and moderate disability (the no disability is the excluded category) in
the data and in the simulations. We nd that the model approximates well asset changes we
observe in the data. Wealth changes decline monotonically with poor health: those in poor
health have run down their assets, those in good health have accumulated. We cannot reject
the null that data and simulations predict the same health and age gradients (full details
are in the Appendix).
5.6.5 Sensitivity: the Importance of Health
In our structural model, health status a¤ects behavior in two ways: it shifts preferences
(non-separability) and it changes the xed cost of work.43 We consider here whether both of
these mechanisms are necessary. First, we consider the case where the xed cost of work does
not vary with health status. Second, we consider switching o¤ the non-separability between
consumption and health. In both cases, we reestimate the structural model to match the
same set of moments as in the baseline. Estimation details are in the Appendix.
When the xed cost of work does not vary with health, the structural estimates of
41We calculate median asset holdings at di¤erent ages and for di¤erent work limitation status. We nor-
malise median asset holdings by the median of annual earning across individuals and across the lifetimes.
42While the model matches the ratios at retirement fairly well, it does less well in matching the speed of
accumulation early in the life cycle. The accumulation is faster in early part of the lifecycle in the simulation
(below age 40), while in the data the acceleration happens primarily after age 40. These di¤erences partly
arise because in the model there are no age-dependent consumption needs (i.e., children).
43There is also the e¤ect of health on wages and the e¤ect of health on the variance of productivity shocks
which are estimated directly.
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the model imply large and numerous deviations between data and simulated moments (or
auxiliary parameters). In particular, the null of no di¤erence between moments in the data
and in the simulation is rejected for 28 of the 36 moment conditions. The very poor t of
the model is because without heterogeneity in the xed cost of work by health status it is
very di¢ cult to generate di¤erences in employment across disability groups: too many of the
disabled remain at work compared to the data. The bad t for the employment numbers
cascades onto the number of DI applicants and this in turn a¤ects the DI moments and so
forth.
When we assume separability between consumption and work limitations, or  = 0; we
also obtain a much worse t relative to the baseline (17 rejections out of 36 moments). The
minimized criterion is 10.5 (as opposed to 3.1 in the baseline). The poor t in this case is
coming from the consumption equation. The coe¢ cients on the work limitations variables
L = 1 and L = 2 are much more negative: statistically we reject the null that data and
simulations produce similar estimates of the auxiliary parameters of the consumption regres-
sion. This is expected: our estimate of  implies that the marginal utility of consumption
is higher when disabled and so resources are moved into periods in which people su¤er a
disability shock to keep consumption smoothed. When  is set to 0 and the non-separability
is removed, there is a larger negative e¤ect on consumption because there is only an income
e¤ect with no o¤setting substitution.
6 Reform of the DI Process
The most important use of our model and structural estimates is the ability to analyze
the e¤ects on welfare and behavior of changing the main parameters of the DI program. We
consider four main changes: (a) changing the generosity of disability payments; (b) making
the program stricterby increasing the threshold that needs to be met in order to qualify
for benets; (c) changing the generosity of the means-tested (food stamp-type) program, and
(d) changing the reassessment rate of disability recipients. For each scenario, we show the
implications for the coverage of the severely disabled, the extent of false applications by the
non-disabled, welfare, aggregate output, and asset accumulation. We calculate the welfare
implications by measuring the willingness to pay for the new policy through a proportional
reduction in consumption at all ages which makes the individual indi¤erent ex ante between
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Figure 3: Changing DI Generosity
the status quo and the policy change considered.44 In all the experiments below the impact
on the government budget is neutralized by adjusting the proportional wage tax iteratively
(see equation (4) in the Appendix). We also examine the sensitivity of our policy experiment
conclusions to changes in the value of risk aversion, one of the key exogenous parameters.
We stress that we cannot draw conclusions about optimal policy from these experiments.
Our policy experiments are best seen as showing partial e¤ects of reform because, although
reform is revenue neutral, we do not take account of general equilibrium e¤ects, nor do we
consider introducing multiple reforms simultaneously.
6.1 Generosity of DI Payments
In the rst experiment, we consider the e¤ects of revenue-neutral, proportional changes
in DI generosity, with the proportional changes ranging from a cut to 60% of its current
value to a 40% increase. Figure 3 shows the e¤ects of these changes.
The left hand side of Figure 3 shows the e¤ects of the policy on the fraction of applications
that are from L = 0 or L = 1 individuals (the solid line labelled False Applications) and
on the fraction of severely disabled who are receiving insurance (the dashed lines labelled
L = 2 Insured, plotted separately for older and younger workers). Both false applications
44This is obtained by calculating expected utility at the start of the life-cycle before the resolution of any
uncertainty ("behind the veil of ignorance").
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and coverage of the severely disabled increase as generosity increases. However, the fraction
of false applicants is much more responsive to changes in generosity than the coverage of
the old severely disabled (as also evident from the rst column of Table 6).45 This fast rise
in false applications generates the welfare losses associated with increased generosity shown
on the right-hand side graph. On the other hand, reduced generosity from its current level
produces negligible welfare benets: while there are less false applications and a lower tax
rate, those who are severely disabled and on DI are less well insured. Further, the welfare
losses as generosity increases are quantitatively small: a 10% increase in generosity implies
a welfare loss of 0.12% of consumption.46
The greater false applications are associated with lower labor force participation and so
lower output. Output falls more than welfare partly because of the utility value associated
with increased leisure and partly because there is better insurance associated with increased
generosity. The assets line shows the e¤ect of generosity on the maximum assets held over
the lifetime. The fall in assets with generosity partly reects the fall in output reducing
saving for consumption smoothing and, to the extent that assets are more sensitive than
output, the additional crowding out of self-insurance.
6.2 Strictness of DI Admissions
Increases in the strictness of the screening process for DI implemented in 1980 led to
sharp declines in inows onto DI and signicant removal of DI recipients, although the criteria
were relaxed again in 1984. The issue is whether the benet induced by greater strictness in
terms of reduced incentives for false applications outweighs the worsening insurance of truly
disabled workers. To tackle this issue, we need rst to dene a measure of strictness of the
program.
As mentioned in Section 3.4, DI evaluators decide whether to award DI as a function
45The fraction of the severely disabled aged under 45 receiving insurance is at a lower level, but similarly
varies with generosity much less than the number of false applicants.
46Our results di¤er from Meyer and Mok (2008), who apply a variant of the benet optimality formula
derived by Chetty (2008) to conclude that the current level of DI benets is lower than the optimal level
(i.e., that it is welfare improving to increase DI generosity). Their formula requires estimates of risk aversion
and prudence, of the fall of consumption on disability, and an estimate of the elasticity of DI application
with respect to DI benet generosity. Hence, there are three reasons why our results di¤er from theirs. First,
the formula imposes a common elasticity of DI application to benets without distinguishing between the
disability status of applicants. But as shown in Table 6, elasticities are very di¤erent when conditioning on
work limitation status. Second, with non-separabilities, the fall of consumption upon disability understates
the value of insurance. Finally, we assume a more moderate degree of risk aversion.
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of a noisy signal about the severity of the applicants disability status, which has some
distribution f :
Sit s f (L; t)
Our estimates of the success probabilities imply that the properties of the distribution of
the signal S vary by age and by work limitation status L. Assume that the Social Security
DI evaluators make an award if Sit > S. The parameter S can be interpreted as a measure of
the strictness of the DI program: other things equal, an increase in S reduces the proportion
of people admitted into the program.
We assume that S lies between 0 and 1 and has a Beta distribution,  (qL;t; rL;t) ; whose
parameters q and r vary with age and work limitation status. The values of qL;t and rL;t and
of S are pinned down by the six structural probabilities (tL) estimated above:
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1  tL = Pr (Rejectionj t; L;Apply) = CDF ( (qL;t; rL;t))
Figure 4 illustrates the resulting distributions of S for those over 45 by work limitation
status, and illustrates some of the errors under the estimated DI program. The area on the
left of S under the solid light grey curve (labeled f(SjL = 2; t  45) measures the probability
of rejecting a deserving DI applicant. The area on the right of S under the dashed grey curve
(labeled f(SjL = 1; t  45)) measures the probability of accepting into the DI program a DI
applicant with only a moderate disability. Increasing the strictness of the test (increasing
S) reduces the probability of false positives (reduces the extent of the incentive problem),
but increases the probability of false negatives (reduces the extent of insurance provided by
the program). It also can have substantial e¤ects on who applies. A policy of changing S
therefore has both benets and costs, trading o¤ incentives against insurance, and we use
our model to determine which dominates when the strictness of the test changes.48
47We need to impose two normalizations, and choose to normalize the mean of the signal for the severely
disabled old and that of healthy young workers (those with the highest and lowest probability of success in
the data). We also impose that the parameter r is identical across age and work limitation status. These
normalizations, alongside the use of the Beta distribution, impose a particular distribution on the signals
which we do not have the data to test. The intuitive advantage of the Beta distribution is that the precision
of the signal increases as true disability status worsens. We considered alternative assumptions, such as a
lognormal distribution and nd qualitatively similar results. See the Appendix for a discussion of the Beta
distribution and the results using a lognormal distribution.
48An alternative policy might be to reduce the noise involved in the evaluation of the signal. We do not
evaluate such a policy. In theory, we could take the cost of extra SSA evaluations as being the same as the
cost of a review. However, the di¢ culty is estimating the e¤ect of evaluations on reducing the noise.
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Figure 4: The Distribution of S for the Older Worker by Work Limitation Status
Figure 5 reports the results of changing the level of strictness as measured by S. The left-
hand graph shows the implications for the DI program in terms of the coverage/disincentive
trade-o¤, while the right-hand graph shows implications for welfare, output, and asset ac-
cumulation. Increasing S from 0.7 to 0.85 reduces the probability of acceptance for the
severely disabled over 45 (under 45) from close to 90% to less than 30% (65% to 5%, respec-
tively). Furthermore, the increase in S reduces the proportion of applicants from those with
no or only a moderate disability. This is shown in the downward sloping line labelled False
Applications.49
The right hand graph shows the willingness to pay for the alternative S in expected
utility terms (the welfare measure ). The willingness to pay increases as S decreases from
its estimated value: the gain in improved insurance from making the program less strict
dominates the loss associated with increased numbers of false applicants and a greater award
error. The magnitude of the gain in terms of consumption equivalent arising from reducing
strictness from its estimated value to S = 0:7 is about 0.004 (0.4%).
This net gain is the result of two o¤setting e¤ects: there is a benet of increased insurance
against disability which individuals are willing to pay for, but this is partly o¤set by a loss
arising from output being lower as individuals work less. Part of the benet of the relaxed
strictness arises from the moderately disabled and the severely-disabled young being o¤ered
49Corresponding to this fall in healthy applicants and lower rate of acceptance, there is a clear decline in
the fraction of awards being made to the healthy or moderately disabled (the Award Error, not reported).
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Figure 5: Changing Strictness
better insurance. The key to this conclusion of reduced strictness being welfare increasing
is, however, the low acceptance rate of young severely disabled individuals onto DI in the
baseline (see Table 5). The subgroup of young severely-disabled individuals are particularly
ill-equipped to insure against disability risk because these individuals face high rejection
rates when applying for DI and yet have not had time to accumulate enough assets to self-
insure. Hence reduced strictness that increases the chance to get into the program is highly
valued.50
French and Song (2011) and Maestas et al. (2011) consider the extent of labour force
participation by DI applicants who have been denied benets because their application was
dealt with by tougherdisability examiners. We can interpret this empirical strategy as
similar to the e¤ect of changing the strictness of the regime in our experiment, as shown in
Figure 5. An increase in strictness in our model leads to a fall in DI receipt, and a corre-
sponding rise in labor force participation. For the severely disabled who are over 45, among
those who do not receive DI because of greater strictness, we calculate that approximately
15% will be working. Among the moderately disabled over 45, the percentage is only slightly
higher at 18%. However, among the moderately disabled under 45, the percentage is 61%.
This range is similar to the range found by Maestas et al. (2011).51
50Denk and Michau (2010) obtain a similar result using a dynamic mechanism design approach to the
insurance-incentive tradeo¤.
51Some caution is needed in making this comparison: the fraction in the model is calculated by comparing
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Figure 6: Changing the Generosity of Food Stamps
6.3 Generosity of The Food Stamp Program
The DI program may interact in important ways with other social insurance programs.
Here we investigate how important such interactions might be. Figure 6 shows the e¤ects
of changing the generosity of food stamps (from a 40% reduction to a 40% increase relative
to the status quo). For false applicants, food stamps are substitutes for disability insurance
and generally application to DI falls as food stampsgenerosity increases. This is because at
some point food stamps provide such a su¢ ciently generous support (without the uncertainty
and inconvenience of application for DI) that false applications for DI fall and people with
moderate disability substitute application for the generous DI program with the increasingly
more generous means-tested program. By contrast, for severely disabled workers food stamps
is complementary to DI: We nd that the fraction of the severely disabled who receive DI
increases as food stamps become more generous. This is because the consumption oor
increases, making application for DI less costly for the severely disabled who were marginal
between working and applying for DI. In addition, more generous food stamps provide direct
insurance against low (permanent) productivity with no risk of rejection. Note, however,
that the e¤ect is non-monotonic especially for the younger severely disabled who face high
rejection rates from the DI program.
two steady-states, whereas in Maestas et al. (2011) the fraction is calculated using randomisation due to the
allocation of lenient assessors.
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Together, these e¤ects imply substantial welfare increases as the generosity of food stamps
increases. A 10% increase in generosity implies a welfare gain of 1.4% of consumption. This
is despite the fall in output and savings that greater generosity induces. It is important to
stress that this movement onto food stamps is funded by a change in the tax rate and so,
although the saving on DI may appear a false saving because of the greater spending on the
food stamp programme, our calculations are that this is welfare increasing despite the tax
rise required. What this simulation highlights is the value of food stamps in providing long
term support for those whose productivity is too low to be able to work for a reasonable
wage. Part of the reason for this result is that the food stamps program is less distortionary
than DI because it does not require people to disengage from the labor force and to stop
working altogether.
6.4 Reassessment Rates
As a nal policy change, we consider changing the reassessment rate. This is a policy
that instead of a¤ecting the nature of the screening process at the point of entry in the
DI program, tries to a¤ect exit rates from the program (which are notoriously quite low).
Given our estimate of the cost per reassessment,52 this has a direct impact on the budget,
as well as the e¤ect induced by changes in the number of recipients and in labour supply.
We assume that the probabilities of success, conditional on work limitation status and age,
are the same at reassessment as at initial application. The details are in the Appendix,
but are briey summarized here, because the e¤ects are not substantial. An increase in the
reassessment rate discourages false applications by those who are not severely disabled, but
also reduces coverage for the severely disabled: reassessment causes some severely disabled to
be removed from DI and this directly reduces coverage, as well as discouraging applications,
as the frequency of reassessment increases. The reduced false applications lead to greater
labour force participation and output, and increased asset accumulation as individuals have
to self-insure further, as shown on the right hand side graph. The net e¤ect on welfare is
negligible.
52For the period 2004-2008, the SSA spent $3.985 billion to conduct 8.513 million continuing disability
reviews. This means a review costs on average $468, and we deate this back to 1992 prices and include
this price in the governments budget constraint.
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6.5 Sensitivity to Risk Aversion
The welfare and behavioral conclusions on policy experiments may be a¤ected by the degree
of risk aversion, which we take from previous literature rather than estimating it. In this
section, we consider how di¤erences in risk aversion a¤ect the policy conclusions. We set the
coe¢ cient of relative risk aversion, ; to equal 3, (compared to the baseline where  = 1:5)
and we re-estimate the structural parameters of the model (i.e., those reported in Table 5).
We nd that the t of our model is somewhat worse than in our baseline, but that we can
still match the moments fairly well. The structural parameter estimates are di¤erent, of
course. First, the probability of success is higher when  is higher and individuals are more
risk averse. This higher probability is necessary to induce risk averse agents to apply, which
is needed to match the DI moments in the data. Similarly, the xed cost of work is estimated
to be higher among the disabled and this is needed to induce the observed non-participation.
Full results are in the Appendix. We use these new estimates of the structural parameters
to redo our three counterfactual policy experiments, varying generosity, strictness and food
stamps.
As the generosity of the program increases, the fraction of the truly disabled who receive
DI increases and the fraction of false applicants also increases, much as in the left hand
side of Figure 3.53 Similarly, this translates into lower output and lower asset accumulation.
However, when risk aversion is higher, the welfare consequences of the increased generosity
are reversed: more generous DI increases welfare when individuals are su¢ ciently risk averse,
because the value of the insurance goes up much more.
The e¤ects of changing strictness are qualitatively similar in all dimensions when risk
aversion is higher: coverage and false applications both fall as strictness increases; similarly
assets and output also increase as individuals work harder and save more in response to the
tougher policy. However, the magnitudes are di¤erent. In particular, the welfare benet
of reducing strictness is substantially greater than in the baseline: the insurance value of
reducing the uncertainty about success for the severely work limited is much greater.
When food stamps become more generous, the fraction of the truly disabled goes up as
in Figure 6, but in contrast to our baseline estimates, the number of false applications also
rises. Output falls and asset holdings fall as generosity increases in a similar way to the
53Figures 3, 5, and 6 are reproduced in the appendix for the case  = 3:
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baseline. Further, welfare increases as in the baseline, but much more markedly: the higher
risk aversion makes individuals value the insurance provided by food stamps more highly.
7 Conclusions
In this paper, we provide a life-cycle framework for estimating the extent of work-limiting
health risk that individuals face and for analyzing the e¤ectiveness of government disability
insurance against that risk. Work limitations have substantial e¤ects on wages, with wages
falling by about 47% for the severely work limited. Government insurance against these
shocks is incomplete: There are substantial false rejections. We estimate that 49% of the
older workers with a severe work limitation who apply for benets are rejected on their rst
application. This is alongside other negative e¤ects, with some workers discouraged from
applying because of the uncertainty surrounding the application process. Similarly, there
are signicant rates of false acceptances, with around 15% of applications from those who
only have a moderate work limitation being accepted.
We use the model to simulate various policy changes aimed at improving the insurance
coverage and mitigating the incentive costs of DI. The simulations show that the number
of moderately disabled individuals receiving DI is particularly sensitive to the policy para-
meters, whereas the number of severely disabled is less sensitive. Thus, reducing DI gen-
erosity leads to a fall o¤ in false applications and misdirected insurance, without reducing
applications from the severely disabled who are essentially inelastic with respect to benet
generosity. Of course, the severely disabled will then receive less insurance, but this reduced
generosity increases welfare from an ex-ante perspective in our baseline. On the other hand,
increasing the strictness of the DI screening process leads to a decline in welfare because the
existing program already su¤ers from turning down large numbers of severely disabled with
little assets enabling them to self-insure. Increasing the generosity of Food Stamps leads to
a fall o¤ in false applications for DI and misdirected insurance, leading to better targeting
of DI and a substantial welfare improvement despite the extra cost of Food Stamps. More
frequent reassessments of recipients directly reduces the number of recipients who are not
severely work limited, but equally importantly more frequent reassessments substantially
reduces the proportion of false applicants, leading to some (small) welfare gains.
In summary, welfare increases if the threshold for acceptance is lower, disability payments
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are lower, reassessment more frequent and food stamp payments more generous. These
conclusions arose because these reforms lead to a separation of the severely work limited
from the moderately limited for whom work is a realistic option. This highlights the need to
have disability classied into more than just a yesor nostate, and raises the question
of whether allowing for partial disability and partial DI payments (as in the Netherlands,
for example) may be a way to reduce the incentive cost of DI. One limitation of these policy
conclusions is the clear non-linearities in behavior apparent from the simulations in section
6. This highlights the value of having careful structural models of behavior in analyzing
disability shocks and the DI process.
One of the implications of our simulations is that changes to the DI process can have
sizable e¤ects on asset accumulation, both by changing the need for self-insurance and by
changing the amount of time that individuals spend out of the labour force. Related to this,
Golosov and Tsyvinski (2006) propose that an asset-test should be introduced to the DI
award process to identify those applicants who accumulated assets explicitly to smooth con-
sumption while falsely claiming DI. We could in principle explore in our framework whether
an asset test discourages applicants among the moderately or severely disabled. However,
the di¢ culty of performing such exercise is that assets in our framework are fully fungible
and serve multiple purposes, including retirement saving, general consumption smoothing as
well as self-insurance. An asset test for DI applicants would therefore have the unfortunate
side e¤ect of reducing retirement saving.
In terms of limitations and further extensions, our model of the disability insurance
process is incomplete: Benitez-Silva et al. (2004) and French and Song (2011) have em-
phasized the importance of the appeal process, whereas we have allowed the social security
administration to make just one decision, albeit we assume that individuals in the model
are able to reapply. In the context of capturing behavior over the life-cycle this may be less
problematic, but it means we cannot examine one dimension of reform, namely the strictness
and length of the appeal judgement relative to the initial judgement. A second restriction is
in terms of the stochastic process for work limitations, which we take to be exogenous. The
probability of receiving a negative shock to the ability to work is likely to be partly under
the individuals control, through occupation choice and other decisions on the job. These
decisions may be a¤ected by the properties of the disability insurance scheme. Finally, we
have ignored the health insurance component of the program (although our xed cost for
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work process could be partly re-labeled to capture health spending di¤erences by health and
employment status). This means we estimate a lower bound of the insurance value provided
by the program.
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